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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-1699 
___________ 
 
DENNIS MCKEE, 
                                          Appellant 
 
v. 
 
PITTSBURGH NATIONAL BANK 
_______________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 14-cv-00107) 
District Judge:  Honorable David Stewart Cercone 
_______________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 18, 2015 
Before:  FISHER, KRAUSE and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  September 23, 2015) 
 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Dennis McKee appeals from the District Court’s order dismissing his complaint.  
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
 
For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
 Because we write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the facts and 
procedural history of this case, we set forth only a brief summary here.  McKee initiated a 
civil action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania in 
February 2014 against PNC Bank, N.A. (“PNC”) (incorrectly identified as Pittsburgh 
National Bank).  It appears that McKee based his complaint on actions taken as a result 
of orders issued by the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County, Pennsylvania, in two 
actions between himself and a former business partner.  Those orders ultimately resulted 
in a portion of the proceeds from the sale of one property being used to pay off the 
mortgage PNC held on a second property.  Although the state court order directed the 
payment of funds to PNC, McKee contends that PNC was nonetheless obligated to file a 
Notice of Foreclosure before it could recover on the lien.  PNC was not an actual party to 
any of the state actions, but merely received from the Prothonotary the payment ordered 
by the Court of Common Pleas.  Despite this fact, McKee sought relief against PNC 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of his Fourteenth Amendment rights 
as well as Pennsylvania law. 
 PNC sought dismissal of the complaint.  PNC argued that McKee’s action was 
barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.1  PNC further asserted that the action was 
                                              
1  That doctrine is derived from the Supreme Court’s opinions in Rooker v. Fidelity Trust 
Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 
U.S. 462 (1983).  Under the doctrine, “federal district courts lack jurisdiction over suits 
that are essentially appeals from state-court judgments.”  Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. 
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subject to dismissal for failing to state a claim insofar as McKee did not allege that PNC 
acted under color of state law in violating any rights actionable under § 1983.  In an order 
entered on February 18, 2015, the District Court granted PNC’s motion and dismissed the 
complaint.  Additionally, given the nature of McKee’s pleading, the District Court 
determined that it was not capable of being cured by amendment.  This timely appeal 
followed. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review 
over the District Court’s decision to grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and over its 
application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  See Fleisher v. Standard Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 
116, 120 (3d Cir. 2012); Turner v. Crawford Square Apartments III, L.P., 449 F.3d 542, 
547 (3d Cir. 2006).2  “[I]n deciding a motion to dismiss, all well-pleaded allegations . . . 
must be taken as true and interpreted in the light most favorable to the plaintiff[], and all 
inferences must be drawn in favor of [him].”  McTernan v. City of York, 577 F.3d 521, 
526 (3d Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted).  To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  As did the District 
                                                                                                                                                  
v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 
2  McKee also sought reconsideration of the order of dismissal.  The District Court denied 
his reconsideration motion in an order entered on March 23, 2015.  McKee did not file an 
amended notice of appeal.  Accordingly, that subsequent order is not within the scope of 
this appeal.  See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii). 
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Court, we construe McKee’s pro se pleadings liberally.  See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 
519, 520 (1972).  
 Even with such liberal construction, we do not hesitate to conclude that the 
District Court properly dismissed McKee’s complaint.  The Rooker-Feldman doctrine 
bars a federal court from exercising jurisdiction over “cases brought by state-court losers 
complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court 
proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those 
judgments.”  Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).  
Four requirements must be met for the doctrine to apply:  “(1) the federal plaintiff lost in 
state court; (2) the plaintiff ‘complain[s] of injuries caused by [the] state-court 
judgments’; (3) those judgments were rendered before the federal suit was filed; and (4) 
the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and reject the state judgments.”  Great 
W. Mining & Mineral Co., 615 F.3d at 166 (alterations in original) (quoting Exxon Mobil 
Corp., 544 U.S. at 284) (emphasis added). 
 The District Court was correct in its conclusion that the crux of McKee’s 
complaint challenges the state court’s decision to have the proceeds of the property sale 
directed to PNC to pay off the mortgage, with only the remainder going to McKee.  To 
the extent McKee can be considered a “state court loser” with respect to those funds and 
as a result of that decision, there can be little doubt that he was inviting the District Court 
to review and disturb the state court judgment.  Accordingly, and for substantially the 
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reasons provided by the District Court, we agree that his claim is barred by the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine. 
 Assuming arguendo that McKee’s complaint could be read to assert a claim that 
falls outside Rooker-Feldman, the District Court properly disposed of it on other grounds.  
To obtain relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must show, inter alia, that the defendant acted 
under color of state law.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Great W. Mining & Mineral Co., 615 
F.3d at 175-76.  Here, however, PNC is a private party.  “Although a private party can be 
liable under § 1983 if he or she willfully participates in a joint conspiracy with state 
officials to deprive a person of a constitutional right,” Max v. Republican Comm. of 
Lancaster Cty., 587 F.3d 198, 203 (3d Cir. 2009), those circumstances are not present 
here.  Even if PNC had initiated the state court action – which it did not – “merely 
resorting to the courts and being on the winning side of a lawsuit does not make a party a 
co-conspirator or a joint actor” with a state official.  Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 28 
(1980).  Accordingly, McKee’s § 1983 claim was subject to dismissal for failure to state 
a claim. 
 McKee fares no better with his contention that Pennsylvania’s “in rem” statutes 
were somehow violated by the manner in which the PNC mortgage was satisfied.  As the 
District Court correctly concluded, “[§] 1983 does not provide a cause of action for 
violations of state statutes.”  Benn v. Universal Health Sys., Inc., 371 F.3d 165, 174 (3d 
Cir. 2004) (quoting Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1113 (3d Cir. 1990)).  
Additionally, we dispose of McKee’s contention that PNC somehow denied him his right 
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to a notice of foreclosure and a jury trial in foreclosure proceedings with little discussion.  
The PNC mortgage was satisfied and there simply was no need for a foreclosure action.  
In light of the nature of the factual allegations set forth in McKee’s filings, we further 
find no abuse of discretion on the part of the District Court in determining that allowing 
him leave to amend his complaint would have been futile.  See Grayson v. Mayview 
State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 In light of the foregoing, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.    
